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The quarantine obligation  
and abundance of enforcement measures
The coronavirus pandemic is posing a difficult test for many 
of the world’s democracies, but countries such as Poland, 
where since 2015 the rule of law has been under threat, may 
be at a higher risk of crossing a critical red line.
This dispatch aims at addressing some concerns regarding 
the way in which certain civil liberties were curtailed in Poland 
in the name of halting COVID-19. More specifically, it will 
focus on technology-led measures for the enforcement of 
quarantine obligations, which invite multiple questions on their 
legality, necessity, and proportionality in a democratic society.
Compared to most other European countries, Poland had 
almost six extra weeks to prepare for the outbreak of the 
coronavirus. To anticipate the upcoming events, already 
on March 2, 2020, the first emergency bill (‘The COVID-19 
Act’)1 was adopted. Soon after the first positive diagnosis 
of COVID-19 was confirmed, various ‘corona laws’ (not 
necessarily all backed by the Parliament, but often in the form 
of executive orders) started to be announced, reaching a 
total number of 129 by mid-June.2 In this difficult-to-navigate 
maze of newly adopted, amended, and annulled provisions, 
numerous far-reaching measures significantly affecting 
fundamental rights and freedoms (including the right to 
privacy and data protection) were introduced.
One of the measures that Poland has taken very seriously 
is quarantine. The existing Act of 2008 on preventing and 
combating infectious diseases3 allows for the quarantine of 
persons exposed to an infectious disease or persons who 





In addition to this, on March 13, 2020, the Polish Minister  
of the Interior and Administration issued an executive order 
closing the borders for the foreigners and obliging citizens 
returning to Poland to undergo a 14-day quarantine.5 Shortly 
thereafter, the obligation was extended to also include all 
household members of a person in quarantine.6 Such a 
broadly defined personal scope of the quarantine obligation 
led to an exponential growth in the number of people subject 
to this measure, and consequently difficulties arose in 
verifying their compliance with the imposed restrictions. The 
capacities of the police, who traditionally used to regularly 
visit the addresses of people in quarantine and request them 
to look out the window, started to be insufficient. This, in turn, 
gave rise to the idea of employing a technological solution. 
Poland adopted three measures involving technology in the 
context of monitoring people in quarantine. The most unique 
concerns a mobile application called ‘Home Quarantine’, the 
use of which upon the revision of the COVID-19 Act became 
a legal obligation applicable to everyone in quarantine.7 
Interestingly, before the app was made compulsory, 
the government tried to encourage citizens to use it by 
proposing a choice: ‘either receive unexpected visits from 
the police, or download this app’.8 The app prompts users 
to share their location data and send selfies on request in 
order to prove that they are staying put.9 Through the use 
of facial recognition technology and analysis of location 
information, the state has attempted to enforce the law 
via the app. Remarkably, the app’s privacy policy10 fails to 
indicate law enforcement as a purpose of data processing 
and claims that the processing takes place for the protection 
of public health.11 Furthermore, it provides 
for a surprisingly long data retention period, 
namely six years, with the exception of the 
pictures, which are supposedly deleted after 
the end of the 14-day quarantine period. This, 
together with the fact that the app’s database 
is accessible to several entities (including the 
police) for the entire data retention period, 
makes it difficult to disregard the fears of 











The other two measures adopted to monitor people in 
quarantine involve direct access by the state to location 
data. First, the prime minister gained a competence to 
issue an administrative decision that may require the 
telecommunication service provider to share with provincial 
governors and other local bodies information about the 
location of the devices of users on whom containment 
measures have been imposed. Due to the extraordinary 
context, such a decision did not allow for an appeal and  
did not require justification.12 The lack of transparency  
is amplified by the fact that neither the government’s  
requests for individual location data, nor responses thereto, 
are shared with the public.
Second, through an amendment made to the 
Telecommunication Act,13 the Minister of Digital Affairs 
was attributed a right to gain access to the location data of 
infected and quarantined persons from telecommunication 
service providers.14 Besides being questionable from 
a legal standpoint,15 the way of introducing such an 
intrusive exception to the principle of confidentiality of 
telecommunication data (including location data) is very 
worrisome from the perspective of the legislative drafting 
process. The provision creating the new competence was 
smuggled into an act known as ‘Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0.’,16 the 
main purpose of which was to create stimulus measures for 
the economy harmed as a result of the coronavirus.
Tough restrictions without  
pronouncing the state of emergency
The above concerns regarding the measures adopted in 
Poland should not overshadow the broader constitutional 
picture, and more specifically the fact that all the ‘corona 
laws’ were adopted without a formal declaration of the state 
of emergency. The reason to refrain from recalling Chapter XI 
(‘extraordinary measures’) of the Polish Constitution,17 which 
contains rules for ‘switching the country into a special legal 
regime meant to overcome exceptional dangers’18 seems to 
have been influenced by the 2020 presidential election.19
Whilst, during the state of emergency, the introduction of 










constitution may be permissible, without declaring such 
a state, only the general derogation clause can apply.20 
Accordingly, any limitation must be ‘imposed only by 
statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for 
the protection of (…) health (…), or the freedoms and rights 
of other persons (…) [and] shall not violate the essence of 
freedoms and rights.’21 Yet, the mere fact that many of the 
measures, including the compulsory quarantine upon arrival 
from abroad, were introduced by means of executive orders 
(i.e. lower-level legislation and not statutes) brings their 
constitutionality into serious doubt.
The way forward
At the time of writing in mid-June 2020, when the epidemic 
curve appears to have been flattening across most of 
Western Europe, Poland is still experiencing a linear pro-
gression of the epidemic. Despite this, almost all lockdown 
measures have been removed, as the presidential election 
is just around the corner. The quarantine obligation applies 
to substantially fewer people, but the measures of its 
enforcement remain unchanged.
Regrettably, not much attention seems to be given in the 
public debate to these legally dubious measures described 
in this contribution, and the potential threats they may entail. 
This is disappointing, considering how often the call for 
the restoration of the rule of law is being repeated in the 
ongoing presidential campaign. It is hard to imagine that in 
a democratic state ruled by a constitution and a respect for 
fundamental rights, any extraordinary powers gained during  















2. This is the number of legal acts found 
with the search engine of the  
Journal of Laws on June 17, 2020, 
that referred in their scope to  













7. See Art. 7e of the COVID-19 Act 
as amended on March 31, 2020, 




8. Though many cases have been 
reported of police checking people’s 
presence in the traditional manner, 










10. The privacy policy exists as one, 
rather short, paragraph in the app’s 
terms and conditions, see: https://
www.gov.pl/attachment/0e28593f-
46f3-4460-9b3c-a00b909ffb18
11. For analysis of the problem of the 
purpose of processing and the 
choice of the legal basis, see: 
Brewczyńska, M. (2020) Report:  
The Polish Government’s Actions to 
Fight Covid-19: A Critical Look  
at the ‘Selfie App’ and Direct Access 
to Location Data. European Data 









14. Art. 11f. See: http://isap.sejm.
gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.
xsp?id=WDU20200000695
Magdalena Brewczyńska is a PhD researcher at the 
Department of Law, Technology, Markets, and Society  
at Tilburg University in the Netherlands.
15. The compliance of the derogation 
introduced into the Polish 
Telecommunication Act with the 
exception provided for in Art. 15 of 
the e-Privacy Directive (Directive 
2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) [2002] OJ L 201/37) 
seems problematic. One reason 
being the lack of reference to the 
protection of ‘public health’ in the 
catalogue of purposes that may 






17. The Constitution of the Republic of 






19. The coronavirus outbreak hit Poland 
amid a presidential campaign. The 
election was originally scheduled 
for May 10, 2020, and subsequently 
rescheduled to June 28, 2020. The 
declaration of the state of emergency 
would result in further delay, given 
that according to Art. 228 par. 7 of 
the constitution, during a period 
of introduction of extraordinary 
measures, as well as within 90 days 
following its termination, elections 
for the presidency cannot be 
held. Furthermore, during a period 
of introduction of extraordinary 
measures the Act on Elections to 
the Presidency must not be subject 
to change. In light of the dynamics 
of the situation, increasing fatigue 
with the lockdown measures, 
and increasingly uncomfortable 
questions regarding the manage-
ment of the crisis, Poland’s ruling 
party Law and Justice (PiS), which 
supports re-election of the current 
President Andrzej Duda, has 
repeatedly refused to declare the 
state of emergency.
20. Art. 31 of the constitution.
21. Art. 31 par. 3 of the constitution.
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